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failure to define key criteria will make it difficult to successf the United Nations hopes to continue commanding the
fully prosecute crimes under this convention. An assessment
world’s respect, it is essential that the organization grow
of the merits and weaknesses of the Safety Convention will likely
stronger, not only in its defiance of intransigent political
prove it more aspirational than effective.
leaders, but also in its willingness and ability to protect ordinary people from the violence and deprivation inflicted upon
them in situations of armed conflict. States will be reluctant
The Genesis and Development of Peacekeeping and
to contribute forces to peacekeeping missions if there is a high
Peace-Support Operations
risk that their peacekeeping role will not be respected and that
The UN has primary responsibility for the maintenance of
they may themselves become the subject of attack. An evaluinternational peace and security. In this context, the UN
ation of the effectiveness of the 1994 Convention on the
Charter provides for coercive measures to compel states to comSafety of UN and Associated Personnel (Safety Convention)
ply with resolutions taken by the Security Council. These
in protecting peacekeepers from attack and so facilitating
coercive measures require achieving and maintaining a conthem in their role as “the world community’s avatars of intersensus among the permanent members of the Security Counnational peace and security” will demonstrate the current
cil. As a result of the divisions of the Cold War, effective
inadequacy of existing protection for UN peacekeeping forces.
action by the Security Council was blocked and the concept
While the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and subsequent proof UN peacekeeping came into existence. Although not speciftocols regulate the conduct of combatants engaged in armed
ically provided for in the Charter, peacekeeping operations
conflicts, prior to 1994, no instrument prowere intended to end hostilities by peacehibited or provided legal remedies for
ful means and create a climate in which the
While the Geneva Conventions
attacks against forces performing tradipeacemaking process could be successof 1949 and subsequent
tional peacekeeping functions, such as
fully pursued. The first UN peacekeeping
facilitating ceasefires and maintaining
force, the United Nations Emergency
protocols regulate the conduct
buffer zones between the parties to the
Force, was deployed in response to the
of combatants engaged in
conflict in order to contain hostilities while
Suez crisis of 1956. Its purpose was to septhe belligerents worked out a peace agreearmed conflicts, prior to 1994,
arate the belligerent forces and supervise
ment. The Safety Convention was adopted
the withdrawal of foreign troops from
no
instrument
prohibited
or
by the UN General Assembly on December
Egypt while a political settlement was being
provided legal remedies for
9, 1994, and entered into force on January
discussed. Other early peacekeeping mis15, 1999. Its purpose is to protect UN and
sions such as the United Nations Peaceattacks against forces
associated personnel from becoming the
keeping Force in Cyprus, the United
performing traditional
object of attack by purporting to crimiNations Emergency Force II, and the
nalize attacks by other armed forces on
peacekeeping functions. . . .
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
peacekeeping troops. The majority of states
followed. These traditional peacekeeping
that have signed the Safety Convention
missions are often referred to as “first-generation” peacehave yet to ratify it.
keeping missions.
The Safety Convention enhances the protection of peaceIn recent years, the traditionally passive role engendered
keepers by providing a means of prosecuting attacks on UN
by such missions has been replaced by a more active role of
personnel as crimes under international law. It is not the
peace making involving, inter alia, national reconstruction, facilonly means of prosecuting such attacks, however. Article 8 of
itating transition to democracy, and providing humanitarian
the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (Rome
assistance. Initially referred to as “second-generation” or
Statute) also provides a means of prosecuting these crimes, but
multi-dimensional peacekeeping, the more generic title of
only in situations where the law of international armed con“peace support operations” has been adopted to cover the wide
flict applies. Article 8, paragraph 2(b) gives the International
range of activities involved. Peace support operations differ
Criminal Court jurisdiction over serious violations of the laws
from traditional first-generation peacekeeping in that manand customs applicable in international armed conflict includdates are generally more complex and often involve peaceing, under 8(b)(iii), “intentionally directing attacks against perbuilding activities such as providing development aid, implesonnel, installations, materials, units or vehicles involved in
menting arms control measures, organizing elections, and
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping missions in accormonitoring human rights violations. These measures go furdance with the Charter of the UN, as long as they are entitled
ther than acting as a buffer to keep peace between belligerto the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the
ent parties, and are intended to assist in the rebuilding of states
international law of armed conflict.” Article 8, paragraph
and the fostering of an environment for long-term peace.
2(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute also prohibits attacks on peaceIn response to the intra-state conflicts that have become so
keepers “so long as they are entitled to the protection given
prevalent in the post-Cold War period, coercive peacekeeping
to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of
operations, often referred to as “peace enforcement operaarmed conflict.”
tions,” have also been deployed. These operations have
The scope of the Safety Convention is broader than the
stronger mandates than traditional peacekeeping or peace supRome Statute, but it is poorly drafted. Lack of clarity and the
port operations. Peace enforcement operations are highly
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controversial because they blur the line between peacekeeping under the Safety Convention and enforcement action
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UN forces can find
themselves operating in complex political situations where the
legal framework within which they must act is unclear. For
example, in his report on UN operations in Bosnia, the secretary-general explained that there was confusion over the role
of the UN Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR). Some nations that had not contributed troops wanted
to expand the UNPROFOR mandate to use the peacekeeping
force to directly confront the Bosnian Serbs, but nations that
had contributed troops wanted to avoid such confrontation.
As a result, the forces deployed were largely configured and
equipped for traditional peacekeeping duties rather than
enforcement action, meaning that they were few in number
and lightly armed. In an effort to find some consensus within
the Security Council:
resolutions were adopted in which some of the more
robust language favoured by the non-troop-contributing nations was accommodated. Chapter VII was
invoked with increasing frequency, though often
without specifying what that implied in terms of
UNPROFOR operations. In this way, the efforts of
Member States to find compromise between divergent positions led to the UNPROFOR mandate
becoming rhetorically more robust than the Force
itself.
Peace support operations have been mounted in conflict situations where clashes involving local actors and UN soldiers
were inevitable because the local population had not consented to their presence. Recent conflicts in Bosnia and
Rwanda, among others, have involved direct attacks on the civilian population as part of the war objective of belligerent factions. Often combatants are not soldiers of regular armies, but
of militias or groups of armed civilians with little discipline and
an ill-defined command structure. There is a danger in these
situations that boundaries between the different types of peace
support operations and their level of acceptable participation
in the conflict can become blurred. In response to a 1993
incident in Somalia, one of several incidents in which UN
troops killed a number of civilians, the UN military spokesman
in Mogadishu commented, “Everyone on the ground in that
vicinity was a combatant, because they meant to do us harm.”
Ultimately, forces deployed on a peace support mission may
find that by using military power to protect an area, they are
drawn inexorably into the struggle and cannot avoid taking
sides.

The 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel
Peacekeeping forces established pursuant to a resolution
of the Security Council or General Assembly are entitled to the
privileges and immunities of the UN provided for in Article
105 of the UN Charter, and in the UN Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN. The secretary-general usually tries to arrange a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with
the state involved to agree upon the applicable arrangements
and conditions during the operation. The high rate of casualties sustained in the conflicts in Somalia, the former
Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, however, has alerted troop-con-
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Kenyan Peacekeeper for the United Nations Mission in
Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) before going on a patrol.
UNMEE was established by the Security Council in July 2000 to
verify a ceasefire agreement. In September 2000, the Council
authorized deployment within UNMEE of up to 4,200 military
personnel to monitor the ceasefire and assist in ensuring observance of security commitments.

tributing-states to the inadequacy of existing protection for
peacekeeping forces.
After only nine months of deliberations, the UN adopted
the Convention for the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel as a solution to the lack of international protection for UN
peacekeeping forces. While attacks on peacekeepers are normally treated as domestic crimes under the criminal laws of
the host state, the law enforcement capabilities of a state
requiring outside forces for internal stability are generally
insufficient to investigate, try, and prosecute persons for such
crimes. The Safety Convention clarifies the protective duties
of the host state, strengthening these duties in situations
where the convention applies.
Protective Duties of the Host State under the Convention
Under Article 7 of the Safety Convention, states parties are
required to “take all appropriate measures to ensure the
safety and security of UN and associated personnel.” Under
Article 11, states parties must cooperate in preventing crimes
against protected personnel. States parties are required to take
“all practicable measures” to prevent preparations in their territories for such crimes, and to exchange information and coordinate “administrative and other measures” to prevent their
commission. The Safety Convention is also the first international agreement to establish that captured peacekeepers are
entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions,
although under the Safety Convention the prisoners must
be returned immediately. Under the Geneva Conventions
prisoners can be held until the cessation of hostilities.
States parties are required to make attacks or threats against
UN and associated personnel crimes under their national
law and to either prosecute or extradite alleged offenders. The
Safety Convention permits states party to it to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction over prohibited crimes where such
crimes have allegedly been committed against that state’s
own nationals or where such crimes have allegedly been committed “in an attempt to compel that State to do or to abstain
from doing any act.” These broad jurisdictional provisions
expand opportunities for enforcement by allowing the more
continued on next page
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The Safety Convention attempts to distinguish between situations in which the convention applies and those in which
activist states to prosecute where the host state is reluctant. The
humanitarian law is applicable, so that UN and associated perSafety Convention does not apply to all situations in which UN
sonnel and those who attack them will be covered by one
personnel are deployed on peacekeeping operations, however,
regime or the other, but not both. This strategy enables the
and it is extremely difficult for both the UN and parties to the
Safety Convention to avoid undermining the Geneva Conconflict to determine when the Safety Convention applies
ventions, which rely in part for their effectiveness on all forces
and when it does not.
being treated equally. Professor Sharp of Georgetown University Law Center is extremely critical of this approach,
Determining When the Convention Applies
believing that it reflects pre-Charter thinking condoning the
Throughout the negotiations, those drafting the Safety
aggressive use of force. He claims that since UN forces serve
Convention had to pursue two almost irreconcilable objectives:
the world community, all UN personnel should be made
guaranteeing protection to as many UN personnel as possible
unlawful targets under all circumstances.
while preventing extension of the convention’s scope of appliThe negotiators of the Safety Convention believed that if
cation so widely as to prevent certain states from ratifying it.
it became a crime to engage in combat with UN forces when
Many states were critical of the scope and expansion of the
they act as combatants, this could have a dramatic impact on
Security Council’s activities in recent years,
other parties’ willingness to adhere to
and sought to limit the application of the
accepted principles of humanitarian law.
Safety Convention to traditional peaceNegotiators feared that if UN forces acting
Throughout
the
negotiations,
keeping operations. The Preamble
as combatants were entitled to the prothose drafting the Safety
acknowledges the contribution of UN pertection of the Safety Convention (whereby
sonnel in the fields of preventive diploan attack upon UN forces would be a crime
Convention had to pursue two
macy, peace making, peacekeeping, peace
even though they were engaged in comalmost irreconcilable
building and humanitarian and other operbat) the belligerent parties would see it as
ations, but there is no specific mention of
objectives: guaranteeing
gross injustice and not abide by any laws at
“peace enforcement” operations. Rather,
all. A primary inducement to comply with
protection
to
as
many
UN
the traditional characteristics of peaceany law is the belief that law applies equally
personnel as possible while
keeping operations are emphasized. The
to everyone and therefore it is in all parties’
Preamble states that “the effectiveness and
interests to comply.
preventing extension of the
safety of United Nations operations are
To ensure consistency with the Geneva
convention’s scope of
enhanced where such operations are conConventions, Article 2(2) provides that
ducted with the consent and cooperation
application so widely as to
the Safety Convention shall not apply to a
of the host State,” and Article 20 states that
UN operation authorized by the Security
prevent certain states from
nothing in the Safety Convention shall
Council as an enforcement action under
ratifying it.
affect, inter alia, “[t]he rights and obligaChapter VII “if any of the forces are
tions of States, consistent with the Charter
engaged as combatants against organized
of the United Nations, regarding the conarmed forces and the operation is one to
sent to entry of persons into their territories.” Article 21 of the
which the law of international armed conflict applies.” Even
convention permits the use of force in self-defense. Article 6
if only part of the operation fulfils these conditions, all of the
calls on UN personnel to respect the laws of the host state and
UN elements participating in that operation will be excluded
to refrain from any action or activity incompatible with the
from its protection. Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conimpartial and international nature of its duties. These proviventions provides that the Conventions shall apply to armed
sions reflect traditional operations rather than operations
conflict between “two or more of the High Contracting Parthat involve coercive measures against the host state or de facto
ties, even if a state of war is not recognised by one of them.”
powers involved in the conflict. Yet, it is in the more controThe same trigger point is used in the Safety Convention to
versial peace enforcement operations that UN personnel are
determine when UN peacekeeping forces cease to be covered
at greatest risk, and it was the extensive casualties that have
by the Safety Convention. There is a strong argument that
occurred in these types of operations that initially triggered
where foreign troops are involved in an internal armed conthe demand for protection.
flict the rules of international armed conflict should apply. The
Originally, the Safety Convention was to be limited to
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has sugoperations “established pursuant to a mandate approved by
gested that “the outsider status of United Nations forces loga resolution of the Security Council,” but its scope was evenically [requires these forces to] be subject to the rules of
tually expanded. Article 1(c) provides that an operation covinternational humanitarian law applicable in international
ered by the convention must be one that is “established by the
armed conflicts.”
competent organ of the United Nations in accordance with
The difficulty of distinguishing between peacekeeping and
the Charter of the United Nations and conducted under
enforcement operations has not been properly recognized.
United Nations authority and control.” Therefore, operaThe fact that an action is based on Chapter VII of the Chartions authorized as opposed to mandated by the Security Counter does not automatically rule out application of the Safety
cil, but carried out under the command and control of one
Convention and render international humanitarian law applicor more states, are outside the scope of the Safety Convention.
able instead. The Safety Convention ceases to apply only in
The mandated operations must be: (1) for the purpose of
cases of armed confrontation between forces deployed by
maintaining or restoring international peace and security;
the United Nations and organized armed forces. The problem
or (2) where an exceptional risk to the safety of the personis when and who determines that a confrontation between UN
nel participating in the operation exists, as decided by the Security Counsel or General Assembly.
continued on next page
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bers of the armed forces, even if one of the states parties
denied the existence of a state of war. But what are the criteria for determining when a conflict in which UN forces are
troops and others reaches the threshold that the participants
deployed reaches the level of armed conflict? The United States
may be regarded as combatants under Article 2(2) of the
argued that although thirty United States soldiers had been
Safety Convention. For example, capturing peacekeepers is illekilled and nearly two hundred wounded, and despite many
gal and can be prosecuted as a crime. Once UN forces begin
hundreds more Somali casualties, there had yet to be an
acting as combatants against organized armed forces, and
event in Somalia “that makes it clear to everyone that this is
the operation is one to which the law of international armed
combat, not peacekeeping.”
conflict applies, they then have the status of combatants. As
A number of national military courts held that the Geneva
such, acts against them are covered by international humanConventions did not apply to the UNOSOM II (United Nations
itarian law rather than the Safety Convention. Capturing comOperations in Somalia II) mission in Somalia. The Court
batants is not a crime, provided that they are treated accordMartial Appeal Court of Canada held in R. v. Brocklebank that
ing to the rules of the Geneva Conventions.
Private Brocklebank, who was arrested for aiding and abetting
Identifying if any personnel are engaged as combatants
the torture of a Somali teenager, had no legal obligation to
against organized armed forces, and whether the operation is one
ensure the safety of a prisoner because neither the Geneva Conto which the law of international armed conflict
ventions nor Additional Protocol II applied
applies may be difficult in practice. The
to peacekeeping operations. The Geneva
American Bar Association noted that “it is
Conventions and Additional Protocol
The
trend
of
the
last
50
years
asking too much for a Somali clan warrior
therefore did not apply to Canadian Forces
or Bosnian militiaman” to understand the
has been to make the
in Somalia. A Belgian military court invesdistinctions in levels of conflict. UN forces
tigating violations of humanitarian law by
threshold
for
the
application
will have to constantly evaluate whether
Belgian forces also came to a similar conof the laws of international
the situation can be classified as one of
clusion.
armed conflict, and then whether or not
armed conflict as low as
The UN argues that it is not a state and
the use of force is sufficient to change their
hence not legally bound by the Geneva
possible.
The
Safety
Convenstatus from that of peacekeeper to that of
Conventions. It also argues that there are
combatant, in order to determine their
tion may work against this
political and practical difficulties if the
obligations and protection status. It remains
UN were to be bound by the rules of intertrend because it is likely that
unclear at what point paramilitary forces
national humanitarian law. Under the UN
the UN and troop contributing
engaged in a conflict constitute “organized
Model Agreement with troop contributing
forces” for the purposes of the Safety Constates will be reluctant to
states and the Model SOFA between the
vention.
UN and host states the UN undertakes to
recognize that the convention
The trend of the last 50 years has been
“observe and respect the principles and
to make the threshold for the application
has ceased to apply.
spirit of the general international conof the laws of international armed conflict
ventions applicable to the conduct of milas low as possible. The Safety Convention
itary personnel.” The ICRC has pushed
may work against this trend because it is likely that the UN and
for recognition that international humanitarian law should
troop contributing states will be reluctant to recognize that the
apply whenever United Nations forces must resort to force. The
convention has ceased to apply. This may inflate the level of
secretary-general, in his Bulletin on the Observance by UN
conflict required before acknowledging that “armed conflict”
forces of International Humanitarian Law, stated that “the funis taking place. The fact that there is no agreement on which
damental principles and rules of international humanitarian
provisions of humanitarian law apply to UN personnel, and
law are applicable to UN forces when in situations of armed
in what circumstances, can only add to the confusion.
conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the
extent and for the duration of their engagement. Therefore
International Humanitarian Law and UN Operations
they are applicable in enforcement actions, or in peaceThere is evidence that UN forces have themselves engaged
keeping operations when the use of force is permitted in selfin conduct and practices that are contrary to humanitarian law.
defense.” Determining at what point UN forces become comOne report on the Somalia peacekeeping mission concludes
batants is problematic since there must be a threshold level
that these were “not cases of undisciplined actions by individual
of force to be crossed—soldiers may use some level of force
soldiers, but stem from the highest echelons of the command
in self-defense and yet not be considered combatants.
structure.” Respect for the privileged status of UN forces is likely
The Safety Convention has been criticized on the grounds
to be undermined if such forces themselves violate humanithat by retaining this ill-defined threshold mechanism the
tarian law. There is also the issue of whether UN forces should
convention effectively puts control of the protection status of
be bound under the obligation to ensure respect for the
UN forces in the hands of the belligerent forces that are the
Geneva Conventions in Common Article 1 to prevent immitarget of the UN mission. If attacks against UN forces remain
nent violations of international humanitarian law. Most lightly
at a low level with only a few people killed, then response by
armed peacekeepers are not able to prevent large-scale abuses.
the peacekeepers is unlikely to be strong enough to cross the
The definition of when the Geneva Conventions apply,
threshold above which the Safety Convention no longer
described in Common Article 2, was designed to avoid the need
applies. If, however, the peacekeepers are subjected to merfor a formal declaration of war as a preliminary to their appliciless and relentless attacks, they may be forced into selfcation. The substitution of the more general expression
defensive action that crosses that threshold. This separation
“armed conflict” for “war” was intended to ensure that the
between convention regime and humanitarian law regime
Geneva Convention would apply to any difference arising
between two states and leading to the intervention of memcontinued on next page
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seems unworkable. Some of the uncertainty could be reduced
by clearer statements on what principles of the law of war apply
to all UN military operations despite their characterization.

Conclusion
The 1994 Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated
Personnel is an important step forward in advancing the protection and safety of UN peacekeepers. It creates a regime for
the prosecution or extradition of persons accused of attacking UN peacekeepers and other persons associated with operations under UN mandates, which may help counter the
impression that UN forces can be attacked with impunity. Due
to the relatively short timeframe in which the convention was
drafted, many essential criteria are left vague and undefined,
resulting in a lack of clarity in its application. Hence, it provides only a preliminary and partial solution to averting and
redressing the dangers facing UN personnel in the field.
Protection of UN peacekeeping forces is a priority for
both humane and pragmatic reasons. Troop contributing
states are unlikely to be willing to send forces to keep the peace
in a foreign conflict if they are likely to be attacked. The special protection afforded peacekeeping forces reflects their
status as non-combatants, but many peace support missions
involve “robust” measures to enforce peace in which it may be
difficult to determine at what point UN forces cease to be noncombatants. While the Safety Convention does not expressly
mention “peace enforcement” operations, it is in precisely
these types of operations that UN personnel are at greatest risk.
Further, for political and constitutional reasons no troops
have ever served under the full command and control of the
UN, and it is unlikely that they will do so in the foreseeable
future. From the point of view of the states or ethnic groups
that are the targets of the mission, “coalitions of the willing”
on coercive peace enforcement operations may seem indistinguishable from combatants.

The responsibility for working out whether a situation is
governed by the Safety Convention regime or humanitarian
law will lie with the commanders and soldiers in the field, and
the criteria on which they must rely are ill defined and probably unworkable in practice. It is difficult to know what
regime is applicable to a situation such as Somalia, in which
the Geneva Conventions were stated not to apply, yet the UN
forces viewed “everyone on the ground in that vicinity [as] a
combatant.”
The crucial questions of UN liability for violations of
humanitarian law and the extent to which UN forces deployed
in an area are responsible for preventing imminent violations are also left vague. Respect for UN forces is likely to be
undermined if they make no effort to prevent violations of
humanitarian law, and it will certainly be undermined if they
actively participate in such violations. Most lightly armed
peacekeepers will not be in a position to prevent large-scale
abuses, but it does not seem right to allow UN forces to stand
idly by in circumstances where breaches of humanitarian law
are taking place in their area of operations. The Security
Convention provides that nothing shall affect the applicability of humanitarian law and universally recognized standards
of human rights to UN operations. This does not, however, clarify when humanitarian law applies, or the extent of UN obligations to uphold the relevant norms and principles.
As a compromise document, troop contributors may take
some solace from the fact that the troops serving with missions
are protected by the terms of the Safety Convention. Although
the convention represents an important step forward and
accession by all states party to it should be encouraged, it will
be ineffective as a means of prosecuting criminals if the criteria by which such crimes are defined remains unclear. 
*Siobhán Wills is a D.Phil. student at Exeter College, Oxford. She
received her LL.M. from Yale and her LL.B. from the National University of Ireland, Galway.
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the Bush administration has sent
mixed messages about its support. The
administration has twice notified the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that it supports ratification of CEDAW,
but a small minority on the far right has
been pressuring the administration to
change its position, citing objections to
elements of the treaty that have already
been addressed in the RUDs, or taking
the non-binding recommendations of
the CEDAW Committee out of context. The administration is now showing signs of yielding to that pressure. In
July, the administration cited the need
for the Department of Justice to conduct another review of the treaty. It
has not been forthcoming with results
of that review, or even a timeline.
While U.S. Senate action has been
stalled, support for ratification has continued to come from the states. To
30

date, legislatures in nine states have
endorsed U.S. ratification: California,
Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and Vermont. The Connecticut
State Senate and the House of Representatives in Florida, South Dakota,
and Illinois also have endorsed U.S.
ratification.
Secretary of State Colin Powell
observed, “In today’s world, any American secretary of state, male or female,
must pay attention to the issues affecting the rights and well-being of
women—over half the world’s population. Women’s issues affect not only
women; they have profound implications for all humankind. Women’s
issues are human rights issues. . . . We,
as a world community, cannot even
begin to tackle the array of problems
and challenges confronting us without the full and equal participation of

women in all aspects of life.”
Strong rhetoric on women’s human
rights is important, but action is more
important. With Republican control
of Congress, the president’s leadership will hold more sway than ever. As
a treaty that establishes a badly needed
human rights standard for the treatment of women and girls, CEDAW
deserves strong U.S. backing. U.S. ratification of CEDAW will give action to
President Bush’s statement: “A thriving
nation will respect the rights of women
because no society can prosper while
denying opportunity for half its
citizens.” 
*Nora O’Connell is the legislative director of Women’s EDGE. Ritu Sharma is the
co-founder and executive director of Women’s
EDGE.

